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THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AS SODOMY
STATUTE
Anthony C. Infanti*
"The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime."
- Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas'
I. INTRODUCTION
I recently had occasion to read an issue of the North
Carolina Law Review containing a symposium on critical tax
theory.2 This symposium consisted of an article by Lawrence
Zelenak critiquing a number of applications of critical tax
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I
would like to thank the University of Pittsburgh School of Law for providing fi-
nancial support for the writing of this essay. I would like to thank (in alpha-
betical order) Kathleen Blee, Patricia Cain, Deborah Brake, Martha Chamallas,
Vivian Curran, Richard Delgado, Michael H. Imbacudn, Darryll Jones, Jeffrey
Kahn, John Parry, Jean Stefancic, and Lu-in Wang for their helpful comments
on previous drafts of this essay. I would also like to thank Hien Ma for his love
and support while I was writing this essay.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
2. Symposium, Critical Tax Theory: Criticism and Response, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1519 (1998). As described by Karen Brown and Mary Louise Fellows,
critical tax theory can be thought of as filling a gap in the traditional tax dis-
course:
What is missing from both the political and the academic debate about
taxes is a serious consideration of how the tax system exacerbates
marketplace discrimination against traditionally subordinated groups.
With dramatic and far-reaching tax reform always a possibility, the
purpose of this anthology[, which forms part of the "Critical America"
series,] is to change the tax discourse to include issues of disability dis-
crimination, economic exploitation, heterosexism, sexism, and racism.
Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Introduction to TAXING AMERICA at 1-2
(Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
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theory in recent scholarship (and praising a few others),3 fol-
lowed by responses from those who had been criticized and
reactions from a number of other tax scholars. Most of the
contributors, including Zelenak, primarily focused their at-
tention on critical tax scholarship exploring issues relating to
race and gender. Nevertheless, one of the contributors, Steve
Johnson, did focus a significant amount of attention on schol-
arship exploring issues relating to sexual orientation.4
Indeed, Johnson devoted nearly one half of his article to
evaluating what he denominated "critical sexual-orientation
studies."5 Johnson began his contribution by setting forth
what he views as the four elements of any "fully persuasive"
claim that the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") discrimi-
nates against a particular group:
(1) There is some particular Code feature that operates to
the substantial disadvantage of some group. Typically,
this would involve showing that as a result of the Code
feature, group members pay proportionately more tax
than non-members.
(2) The offending Code feature is not compensated for by
other aspects of the Code that disproportionately benefit
the group in question. That is, there must be an on-
balance or on-net evaluation, a showing that the unfavor-
able Code aspects hurt group members more than the fa-
vorable Code aspects help them.
(3) The appropriate way to redress the problem would be
changing the Code, rather than changing non-tax rules or
practices.
(4) A reasonable solution exists. That is, a way exists to
reform the offending Code section, and that way is techni-
cally feasible, efficacious, and unlikely to create other se-
rious problems.6
Johnson then measured "two significant articles" in the criti-
3. Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1521 (1998).
4. See Steve R. Johnson, Targets Missed and Targets Hit: Critical Tax
Studies and Effective Tax Reform, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1771 (1998).
5. Id. at 1772-79. "Critical sexual-orientation studies" appears to refer to
the subset of critical tax scholarship addressing issues related to sexual orienta-
tion. Id at 1772.
6. Id. at 1771-72 (footnote omitted).
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cal sexual orientation literature against this standard . In
Johnson's eyes, both of the articles came up short for the
same reason: they had failed adequately to address the stan-
dard's first and second elements; namely, whether, on bal-
ance, same-sex couples pay more tax than married couples.'
Johnson then concluded his discussion of critical sexual orien-
tation studies with the following sentence: "For these reasons,
I believe that scholars and advocates have not yet convinc-
ingly demonstrated that, on net, the failure to recognize
same-sex couples as married hurts them by imposing sub-
stantially higher federal income tax liabilities on them."9
My immediate reaction to Johnson's article can be sum-
marized in one word: astonishment. As a gay man, I was
puzzled at how equal treatment could be boiled down to a
simple cost-benefit analysis. How could Johnson have ig-
nored the ways in which the Code stigmatizes gays and lesbi-
ans and attempts to force them into the closet? Can any net
tax benefit really make up for the patently unequal and dis-
criminatory treatment visited by the federal government
upon gays and lesbians through the medium of the Code? Put
another way, can my recognition as a full member of society
be bought" at the cheap price of an exemption from the mar-
riage penalty and from the various attribution and loss disal-
lowance rules that apply to married couples?"
7. Id. at 1773. The two articles are Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples
and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 97 (1991) [hereinafter Cain,
Same-Sex Couples], and Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72
DENV. U. L. REV. 359 (1995).
8. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1773.
9. Id. at 1779.
10. If you can even call it a "sale." No one ever asked me if I was willing to
surrender my rights in exchange for compensation.
11. Among the potential tax disadvantages of marriage, Johnson points out
that "[d]epending on [their] income levels,... the spouses [may] pay more in
income tax than they would have had they stayed single." Johnson, supra note
4, at 1778. As explained further by a leading treatise,
because the rate brackets for a married couple filing jointly are less
than twice as wide as those ... for unmarried persons, many couples
pay more taxes than they would if they could file as unmarried persons.
These "marriage penalties" are greatest for spouses whose incomes are
equal and decline and eventually become "marriage bonuses" as
spouses' incomes become more unequal.
4 BORIS I. BIrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS 111.3.2, at S11-43 (3d ed. Supp. 2002). Johnson also
points out that "several Code sections bar favorable tax results if related par-
ties-including spouses-are involved in a transaction." Johnson, supra note 4,
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I eventually set my astonishment aside and moved on
with other work. But then, not more than a day or so later, I
happened to come upon Patricia Cain's Feminist Legal Schol-
arship.2 In that article, Cain speaks about "gendered misun-
derstanding," which she describes in the following terms:
Gendered misunderstanding occurs because men and
women have different life experiences. Thus, they some-
times fail to understand conclusions drawn by the opposite
sex that are based on those different life experiences. The
potential for misunderstanding is greater in the case of
conclusions based on women's experience because much of
women's experience has been buried from male view. Part
of the feminist project is to uncover these buried experi-
13
ences.
At any other time, the notion of gendered misunderstand-
ing would simply have rung true to me; however, given my
recent experience with Johnson's article, it more than rang
true-it resonated. I realized that, because of our different
life experiences, Johnson and I had essentially been commu-
nicating past (rather than with) each other.
To paraphrase Cain, what had occurred was "hetero-
homo misunderstanding"-our different life experiences
(mine as a gay man and Johnson's as a man who does not
identify as gay) 4 were producing in us different perspectives
on the taxation of same-sex couples. 5 Johnson was articulat-
ing a view based on the "traditional" tax narrative, which is a
product of the group (i.e., white heterosexual males) that has
always dominated the creation and application of the Code.
at 1777. For example, § 267 disallows losses incurred in transactions between
related parties (including spouses). I.R.C. § 267(a), -(b)(1), -(c)(4) (2004). In ad-
dition, § 318 attributes the ownership of stock between family members (includ-
ing spouses) for a number of purposes in the Code-including determining
whether a redemption of stock will be treated as a distribution or exchange,
whether the controlled foreign corporation regime will apply to a foreign corpo-
ration, and whether certain information must be furnished to the Internal
Revenue Service with respect to a foreign corporation. I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i), -
(b) (2004) (cross-referencing §§ 302, 958(b), and 6038(e)(2), respectively).
12. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REv. 19 (1991)
[hereinafter Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship].
13. Id. at 33.
14. In The AALS Directory of Law Teachers, Johnson is not listed among
those who identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. ASS'N AM. LAW SCH., THE AALS
DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 2002-2003, at 1425-27 (2002) [hereinafter AALS
DIRECTORY].
15. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, supra note 12, at 33.
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In the traditional narrative, the Code is facially neutral and
progressive;16 it seems to benefit and burden all groups and,
on the whole, to be tilted in favor of the less fortunate because
it demands less of them. Seeing the Code through the lens of
this narrative, members of the traditionally dominant group
find it difficult to understand why minorities, women, or gays
and lesbians would choose to make the Code a target for ac-
cusations of discrimination.
I perceive the Code somewhat differently from those who
accept the traditional tax narrative as a form of received
truth. My own view of the Code and its treatment of same-
sex couples is necessarily colored by my experience of life as a
gay man. The sum of this experience, which constitutes a
narrative in its own right, casts a far less favorable light on
the Code. For me, the Code is not neutral; rather, it appears
16. See, e.g., James D. Bryce, A Critical Evaluation of the Tax Grits, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 1687, 1687 (1998) (expressing incredulity at the attacks by women and
African Americans on the income tax, which "[t]hroughout its history in the
United States,... has been an instrument for redistributing income"); Charles
0. Galvin, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously - A Comment, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1749, 1749 (1998). Galvin explains:
A tax system should be neutral in its effect on each citizen's decision-
making. Therefore, assuming a democratic ideal of a free society with
equal opportunity for all, the framers of tax policy should strive for a
system that is blind as to gender and color. I agree with Professor Ze-
lenak that any attempt to tailor the system to meet the criticisms of
feminists or racial groups rapidly becomes a nightmare of dilemmas
that are just not resolvable. . . . A better course is to achieve neutrality
by the attainment as nearly as possible of a pure Haig-Simons compre-
hensive model or a pure consumed income model.
Id.; see also Erik M. Jensen, Critical Theory and the Loneliness of the Tax Prof,
76 N.C. L. REV. 1753, 1762 (1998) ("If racial subordination is really so pervasive
that it exists even when legislators are drafting facially neutral tax statutes,
with the best of intentions, what in the world are people of good will to do? In-
deed, can there be any people of good will?"); Johnson, supra note 4, at 1781
("Moreover, on a net basis, the Code is not stacked against the less affluent.
The ramshackle Code contains something good for almost everyone, and some-
thing bad for almost everyone."). Richard Schmalbeck states:
As I noted at the outset, I first read Moran and Whitford's article skep-
tically. The federal income tax is certainly facially race-neutral. And
the tax is progressive, which must greatly favor African-Americans in
light of their significantly lower average incomes. I continue to believe
that those things are true, and that the progressivity of the tax system
is a far more important characteristic from an African-American view-
point than are any of the characteristics Moran and Whitford consider
in their article.
Richard Schmalbeck, Race and the Federal Income Tax: Has a Disparate Im-
pact Case Been Made?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1817, 1834 (1998).
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to be just another manifestation of the fluid mixture of hostil-
ity, bewilderment, and discomfort that generally characterize
society's reaction to homosexuality. From my perspective, I
can't help but see the Code as another weapon for discrimina-
tion and oppression in society's already well-stocked arsenal.
Like women's experiences, my experiences and those of
other gays and lesbians have long been buried from view.
Even with the significant progress made by the gay rights
movement during the past several decades, frank discussion
of how gays and lesbians experience life is generally not wel-
come outside of the circle of those with shared experiences."
It is no wonder that, having been suppressed by society, these
gay narratives have never been woven into the traditional tax
narrative, with the quite natural result that society remains
insensitive to the impact of the Code on gays and lesbians.
Inspired by Cain and others, 8 I have decided to make an
attempt to bridge the gap between gay and straight under-
standing of the Code by relating a portion of my gay narrative
and showing how it colors my view of the taxation of same-sex
couples. By explaining the experiences behind my percep-
tions, I hope that I will be able to help my overwhelmingly
heterosexual colleagues"' to understand just how demeaning
17. See, e.g., Eric Dyer, Gay Documentary Gets Audience; The Documentary
on Gay Issues in Schools Was Kept off Public Television, NEWS & RECORD
(Greensboro, N.C.), Feb. 11, 2000, at D1; Stephen Karam, Generation Quiet,
ADVOCATE, Oct. 14, 2003, at 12; Cristina Smith, Lawyer Life After "Lawrence,"
TEX. LAW., July 28, 2003, at 24, available at www.law.com (last visited Aug. 14,
2003); Rick Telander, It's Not Safe to Be Out; Magazine Editor Says He's Hav-
ing Affair with Player, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 20, 2001, at 146; Jose Antonio
Vargas, HIV-Positive Without a Clue; Black Men's Hidden Sex Lives Imperiling
Female Partners, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at B1.
18. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, supra note 12, at 38 (proposing that
feminist legal scholars explain women's experiences to those who are
"stranger[s] to those experiences"); see also MARTHA CHAMALLAS,
INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 4-5 (2d ed. 2003) ("As a methodol-
ogy, validation of personal experience has much to offer marginal groups who
lack the power to have their understanding of the world accepted as the way
things are."); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others. A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (discussing the general value
of stories told by outgroups); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46
STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994) (discussing the particular value of stories told by gays
and lesbians).
19. Of the 627 individuals listed under the heading "Taxation, Federal" in
the 2002-2003 edition of The AALS Directory of Law Teachers, only eleven (or
1.75%) self-identified as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. AALS DIRECTORY, supra note
14, at 1356-61, 1425-27.
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and oppressive the Code can seem to gays and lesbians-
regardless of any net financial benefit that same-sex couples
may receive, or any net financial detriment that they may
suffer, under the Code."°
The remainder of this essay is divided into three parts.
In Part II, through a series of vignettes,21 I share my personal
experience with the fluid mixture of hostility, bewilderment,
and discomfort that our overwhelmingly straight society di-
rects at gays and lesbians. In Part III, I turn to more tradi-
tional legal analysis and discuss the ways in which the Code
can be viewed as just another manifestation of straight soci-
ety's reaction to homosexuality. Part IV consists of conclud-
ing remarks.
II. THE NARRATIVE
Coming out was a rather slow and somewhat painful
process for me-in spite of (or maybe because of) my always
having had a clear sense of my sexual orientation. I've known
for as long as I can remember that I'm gay. To some, this
statement probably sounds trite; to others, it may be fodder
for the debate over the immutability of sexual orientation.
The point of this narrative is not, however, to please or to
provide proof-it is to share my own experience of knowing,
from an early age, that I am not part of the heterosexual ma-
jority.
In retrospect, even some of my early childhood memories
bespoke the existence of this difference. At recess in the early
years of elementary school, the kids in my class usually broke
off into gendered groups; in other words, the boys played with
20. Patricia Cain has also attempted to combat "the notion that discrimina-
tion in tax law should be viewed merely as a comparison of direct economic
benefits and burdens." Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465, 466-67 (2000) [hereinafter Cain, Het-
erosexual Privilege].
21. Carolyn Jones has attempted to open tax scholars up to the use of nar-
rative by mapping tax narratives that already exist around us. See Carolyn C.
Jones, Mapping Tax Narratives, 73 TUL. L. REV. 653 (1998). There are now ex-
amples of both ingroup and outgroup narratives in tax. Examples of ingroup
narrative include the recently published TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT
TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAx CASES (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003), and
George Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics,
and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553 (1980). An example of outgroup nar-
rative is Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 677, 683-89, 696-700 (2000) [hereinafter Cain, Death Taxes].
2004 769
SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW
the boys, and the girls with the girls. I proved the exception
to this rule, spending every recess playing hopscotch and
other games with the girls. Even at such a young age, one of
my classmates recognized both the norm and my variation
from it. She tried a number of times to persuade me that I
should be playing with the boys instead of the girls, going so
far as to bring me over and introduce me to some of the boys
in an attempt to get me to start playing with them. But her
efforts were to no avail. I never ended up playing with the
boys, and the girls ended up accepting me as I was. At the
end of that year, one of the girls held a birthday party to
which she invited all of the other girls in the class-and me.
Nevertheless, the potential for continued acceptance of
my difference quickly faded away. I vividly recall the torture
visited upon one of my classmates near the end of elementary
school (which was sixth grade where I grew up), simply be-
cause his father had gone away on a business trip to San
Francisco. This may not seem like an event that would war-
rant, or could even give rise to, torture; yet, the other boys re-
lentlessly taunted him over a period of several days. They
kept calling his father a faggot and saying that he had gone to
San Francisco to be with the other fags (why else would he
have gone there?). They teased him that this wasn't a busi-
ness trip at all, just an opportunity for his father to go visit
his boyfriend. All of the accusations and insinuations clearly
hurt and upset the son. He quickly went on the defensive, as-
serting that his father wasn't a fag at all-he was just there
for work.
Plainly, these elementary school boys had already
learned from people around them that calling someone a fag-
got is an insult, and had further ascertained that, in the hier-
archy of insults, questioning a man's heterosexuality is one of
the more potent forms of attack. Somehow, they had also
learned that San Francisco is the gay capital of the United
States, which was the crucial piece of knowledge that had
furnished the connection between the ostensibly innocuous
business trip and the sustained, malicious taunting.
What amazes me most about this incident is that these
boys had absorbed several important pieces of information
about sexual orientation years before they would understand
what sex is or what it involves. At the time of the incident,
they probably didn't fully understand what being gay means
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or what gay sex represents. In any case, the finer points of
homosexuality were irrelevant, because all they really needed
to know for their attack to be successful was that being a fag
is bad and that all fags live in San Francisco. Society had ob-
viously armed them with these weapons at an early age.22
When I was growing up, these events formed part of an
atmosphere of rejection and hostility towards homosexuality.
They were accompanied by an endless parade of fag jokes, de-
rogatory remarks, and whispers about someone's sexual ori-
entation (because such a discussion was not a topic for polite
conversation). And the Catholic Church (to which my family
belonged) seemed to be the grand marshal of this parade with
its focus on the traditional family and loud condemnation of
homosexuality. My fifth-grade catechism teacher epitomized
this pious self-righteousness. She was a frustrated, would-be
nun who liked to regale us with stories of how she prayed the
rosary while driving (and you thought cell phones were a
hazard), and who seemed to derive great enjoyment from tell-
ing us that we would burn in hell for the least infraction of re-
ligious law. The clear message from all quarters was that be-
ing gay is abnormal, wrong, and a ticket straight to hell.
Faced with this level of disapprobation, I found the closet
to be a necessity once I realized that this scorn was appropri-
ately directed at me. I began to deny my sexual orientation to
myself and to others-in the idle hope that I could simply
wish away being gay and not have to spend eternity in blazes.
Interestingly, denial became both a means of defending
myself from attack and a proxy for those attacks. Through
denial, I tried to fend off attacks from others, but at the same
22. Straight people can't help but be aware of the hostility that is directed
at gays and lesbians-highly-publicized examples that leap to mind include the
murder of Matthew Shepard, see James Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for
Dead; 2 Are Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at A9 (describing the hate
crime in which an openly gay college student in Wyoming was beaten to death);
James Brooke, Gay Man Dies from Attack, Fanning Outrage and Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at Al; Colorado's Amendment 2, a law that prohibited the
enactment of laws that protect gays and lesbians from discrimination, see Linda
Greenhouse, Gay Rights Laws Can't Be Banned, High Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1996, at Al; and Fred Phelps, a man famous for traveling the country
to picket the funerals of people with AIDS, carrying signs bearing such apho-
risms as "Fags Burn in Hell" and "Gays Deserve to Die," see Chris Bull, Us vs.
Them: Fred Phelps, ADVOCATE, Nov. 2, 1993, at 42. Nonetheless, I don't think
that many straight people realize how deeply ingrained this hostility is in soci-
ety and how early children begin to mimic it.
2004
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time began to attack myself-questioning what was wrong
with me, why I was different, why I couldn't change and be
normal like everyone else. By high school, society had so suc-
cessfully ingrained in me its hostility toward gays and lesbi-
ans that, even when defending myself from its attacks, I was
still being attacked. I had simply traded one oppressor (soci-
ety at large) for another (myself). To cope with the anguish
created by this self-loathing, I redirected my energy and at-
tention toward studying. School work helped to lessen the
constant pain and anguish, and brought the added bonus of
serving as a convenient excuse for not dating.
Things didn't improve in college. Not many people at
school were out of the closet, and the environment wasn't par-
ticularly welcoming for the few who were open about their
sexual orientation. I learned this for myself within a week of
arriving at school. I had been assigned to an all-male dormi-
tory that year, which, you would think, would be a dream
come true for any young gay man. But, in reality, it was more
like a nightmare. The testosterone level in the dorm ran
high, and the anti-gay remarks and fag jokes were more per-
vasive and biting than I had ever experienced before (or, for
that matter, since). During that first week, when everyone
feels vulnerable, nervous, and anxious about being away from
home, I had a rather negative encounter with two upper-class
students. I had just passed them in the stairwell when they
started spitting "queer" and "fag" at me-in a tone that oozed
venom and with a physical presence that can only be de-
scribed as menacing. I couldn't understand why they had
targeted me. Was it that obvious? Whether it was or not,
they had made it abundantly clear that being open about my
sexual orientation at college would likely culminate in hospi-
talization. After that episode, I became all the more firmly
ensconced in the closet, because I was not about to risk hav-
ing to come out to my parents from a hospital bed.23
In law school, I eventually came to the realization that
this was no way to live. As I grew older and approached the
23. See Deborah Brake, The Cruelest of the Gender Police: Student-to-
Student Sexual Harassment and Anti-Gay Peer Harassment Under Title I, 1
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 37, 38 (1999) (exploring "the inconsistencies in the treat-
ment of peer sexual and anti-gay harassment under sex discrimination law" and
developing a gender-role policing model of sexual harassment under Title IX
that would provide more meaningful protection to gay and lesbian students).
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point where I would be self-sufficient and not accountable to
others, the closet became an intolerable burden-one that far
outweighed any benefits that it might confer. Slowly, I began
to take steps toward coming out to myself. I started to be-
come comfortable with the idea of being gay and with allow-
ing myself to be gay. By the end of law school, I had reached
a point where I was relatively comfortable with myself and
was ready to start to explore my sexuality with other gay
men.
I finally started dating-at the age of twenty-four. While
I resented the way society, through its hostility, had robbed
me of valuable time, I also felt as though I had been rewarded
in the end for my suffering and forbearance. The third person
that I met after I started dating was Michael, a master's stu-
dent in chemical engineering at Berkeley. We soon became
inseparable, spending nearly every minute of our free time
together. When I met him, I was in my last semester of law
school and he had not quite finished his master's degree. I
had already accepted a clerkship in San Diego that was to
start at the end of the summer, and had accepted a summer
associate position with a firm in New York that would occupy
my time between graduation and the clerkship. But we had
fallen in love, and I knew that I wanted to make a life with
Michael. So, I asked him to move with me to San Diego, and
he agreed.
In San Diego, we soon learned what it can be like to live
as an openly-gay man outside of relatively gay-friendly cities
like San Francisco and New York. It started with the decep-
tively simple task of searching for an apartment. All we could
afford was a one-bedroom apartment. We started searching
through the advertisements in the newspaper, and I re-
sponded to several of them. I made sure each time to be clear
that the two of us would be sharing the apartment, because I
figured that it was better to avoid problems at the outset
rather than to have to deal with them after we had settled in
an apartment. This policy quickly paid off. I will never forget
the conversation that I had with one landlady. When I told
her that the two of us would be sharing the apartment, she
responded that she could not conceive of why two men would
want or need a one-bedroom apartment, and then, in no un-
certain terms, told me that she would not-under any cir-
cumstances-rent a one-bedroom apartment to us.
2004 773
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We eventually went to a property management company
that helped us find an apartment in Hillcrest, which is the
gay section of San Diego. Hillcrest is a nice neighborhood
that is located on the edge of Balboa Park; indeed, we lived
across from the park and within walking distance of the San
Diego Zoo, which we visited regularly during our year there.
Hillcrest also happens to be unfortunately (and, in San Diego,
nearly unavoidably) located near a military installation.
While we lived there, military men came through to taunt the
"fags" and "dykes." Not long after we moved into our apart-
ment, we attended a candle light vigil for a youth who had
been stabbed to death a year earlier for appearing to be gay.
Later in the year, someone who had stopped at the Hillcrest
Jack in the Box (a fast-food restaurant) had all of his car win-
dows smashed in by some teenagers, and another person was
shot at late in the evening.24 This was our introduction to life
as openly gay men in "America's Finest City"!
25
While working as a summer associate in New York be-
tween law school and my clerkship in San Diego, I lived with
my parents and commuted to the City from their house in
New Jersey. Shortly before I was to return to California, my
mother, prompted by suggestions from others in my family,
asked me straight up (so to speak) if I were gay. As denial
was no longer an option for me, I honestly answered "yes."
She then asked if Michael, whom my parents had met at my
law school graduation, was my "special friend" (where she got
that term from, I still don't know). Again, I honestly an-
swered "yes." Although a little upset, she generally took it in
stride. I was her son, and my being gay was not going to
change how much she loved and cared for me.
My father was, however, a different story. A first-
generation American whose parents had emigrated from Italy
a few years before he was born, he had been brought up in a
highly traditional, patriarchal home where the hus-
24. For a description of the pervasiveness and forms of, as well as the moti-
vations behind, anti-gay violence, see Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of "Hate,"
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 867-94 (1999). For another example of how the specter of
anti-gay violence can impact gays and lesbians and their decision to come out of
the closet, see Susan J. Becker, Being out and Fitting in, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC.
269, 273 (1996).
25. San Diego refers to itself as "America's Finest City." See
http://www.sannet.gov/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2004) (simply searching for the
phrase "America's Finest City" on the city's own web site returns dozens of hits).
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band/father ruled. Our home was run exactly the same
way-my father's word was supposed to be law; doing some-
thing without his permission or contrary to his views simply
was not to be tolerated.
In September, after I had moved back to California and
begun my clerkship, my mother decided to tell my father
about our conversation earlier in the summer, and informed
him about my sexual orientation. Needless to say, he did not
take the news nearly as well as my mother had. My father
telephoned to "talk" while I was cooking dinner one evening.
I had just sent Michael to the grocery store to pick up some-
thing that we had forgotten, so I was home alone at the time.
My father started the conversation by asking me whether
what my mother had said was true. I answered him honestly,
but apparently had not given the answer that he wanted to
hear.
He proceeded to excoriate me for doing "this" to them (he
couldn't even bring himself to talk about it directly), as if I
was intentionally trying to hurt or defy him. When he had
also confirmed that Michael was my "special friend," he told
me that Michael was not welcome in their home. I told him
that if Michael was not welcome in their home, then neither
was I-and he shouldn't expect to see me in New Jersey any-
time soon. After informing him that he was also not welcome
in my home (which was largely a symbolic gesture because he
hated to fly and had only been to California twice during the
four years that I lived there-and then only after a great deal
of cajoling), I told him that I had my own life, I was support-
ing myself, I did not have to answer to him anymore, and I
did not appreciate being upset by him while I was trying
peacefully to prepare dinner after having worked all day. I
then unceremoniously hung up the phone.
I didn't talk to my father again until after Christmas. I
had called my mother often while in college and law school,
but after that conversation, started calling only once a month
to avoid having to talk to my father. When he did answer the
phone, I would simply ask him to put my mother on and re-
fuse to respond to anything that he said. When my mother
eventually asked if I was coming home for the holidays, which
I had always done throughout college and law school, I told
her that I would not be going back East because I was not
welcome in their home. My father and mother placed a great
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deal of importance on family, especially at the holidays. I
knew that if I didn't go home for the holidays they Would un-
derstand that I was standing firm and that I was not going to
change who I was or go back into the closet just to obey my
father.
And when I didn't return home for the holidays, my fa-
ther realized how serious the situation had become. My
mother later recounted how he had gotten up from the table
at Thanksgiving dinner because he was so upset. One of my
mother's sisters went out to see what was troubling him. He
explained the situation to her (which, of course, she already
knew about from my mother), and she told him that it was
really no big deal. After Thanksgiving, he went to the local
library and began taking out books on homosexuality. In con-
trast to my mother, my father did not enjoy reading. He read
the newspaper and did crossword puzzles, but did not read for
pleasure. Having grown up on a farm, he much preferred
working in the garden. My knowing this made his effort all
the more touching. His reading and conversations with oth-
ers in my family finally led him down the path to acceptance
and reconciliation. He called me after Christmas to apologize
for the way that he had treated me on the telephone in Sep-
tember. After that, he was squarely in our corner and never
wavered in his support of me, Michael, or our relationship.
When my mother had asked me earlier that year if Mi-
chael was my "special friend," it was the first time that I had
seen someone react to homosexuality with a combination of
bewilderment and discomfort (rather than unadulterated hos-
tility). She found herself stumped by how to refer to our rela-
tionship. By now, I have experienced this uncomfortable
groping for words on countless occasions-you see, most
straight people can handle gay men one at a time, but a gay
couple equals gay sex, which is something that most straight
people decidedly can't (and don't want to) handle.26 When my
26. Many straight people may feel this way, whether or not they admit it. I
only know one straight person who has any interest in seeing, or who has actu-
ally sat through, an entire episode of Queer as Folk, which is chock full of rela-
tively explicit gay sex. An on-screen kiss between two men is still a relative rar-
ity even on the gayest of network television shows (e.g., Will and Grace). And
when there is a kiss, it usually occurs under less than romantic circumstances.
Although cable television has been hailed for being more progressive than net-
work television when it comes to portraying gays and lesbians, Bravo's gay-
dating reality series, Boy Meets Boy, prohibited "any physicality beyond kiss-
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mother acknowledged our relationship, she, like most straight
people, was clearly uncomfortable with admitting to herself
that there was a sexual dimension to it. This discomfort,
when combined with the lack of a ready label for a relation-
ship between two gay men, has generated any number of de-
sexualized euphemisms such as "friend" or my mother's term
"special friend" (both of which have a decidedly platonic over-
tone), "partner" (which sounds like you're in business to-
gether), and "significant other" ("significant"-I would de-
scribe my dog Kasha as a significant part of my life; "other"-
other than what?).27
I have encountered this combination of bewilderment and
discomfort in other settings as well. The reaction to my in-
quiry about the one-bedroom apartment in San Diego evinced
bewilderment and discomfort mixed with outright hostility.
Paying with a check written on a joint account suddenly be-
comes a political statement when the joint account holders
listed on the check are two men with different surnames. The
check is often greeted with a raised eyebrow or a puzzled
look. One time, Michael's secretary at a law firm that he
worked at in New York 21 whited out my name on a copy of one
of our checks that she was submitting for reimbursement, os-
tensibly to protect him from the possibility of reprisals.
Then there are the solicitations. I can't tell you how of-
ten we received calls asking if "Mrs. Infanti" was home. After
a while, Michael started saying that he was Mrs. Infanti. The
responses ranged from perplexed hang-ups to truly clueless
telemarketers who would just keep pitching whatever it was
ing" (and closed-mouth kissing at that-half of the potential suitors were
straight) because they didn't want the show "'to be all about sex.'" Gail Shister,
Bravo Is Set to Air Gay Reality Series, HOUS. CHRON., May 31, 2003, at 9; see
also David Zurawik, For Best Gay Fare, You've Got to Pay, BALT. SUN, June 25,
2003, at IC (describing the disparity in the depth and quality of gay program-
ming on network television versus cable television).
27. See Anthony C. Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin: A Step in the Right Direction
for Gay Rights 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 2-3 (1994) stating:
Baehr v. Lewin is not an unfettered victory for gay rights. In fact, it
may be somewhat of a failure. The plurality took every opportunity to
distance itself from gay marriage and explicitly based its decision on
the farcical construct of a "same-sex marriage": a marriage touted to be
not just for gays, but for any two persons of the same sex who wish to
marry.
Id.
28. When we moved to the New York area, Michael enrolled in law school at
New York University, and he now works as a patent attorney.
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they were being paid to sell. In the mail, solicitations sent to
both of us (because we held nearly everything jointly) were of-
ten addressed to Anthony and "Michele." You can just imag-
ine the thought process behind this one: "Two men listed to-
gether? Must be a mistake. What would two men be doing
living together? It must be a typo, I'll just fix it." And, bang!
Michael just became Mrs. Infanti after all.
And so as not to be accused of unfairly singling out San
Diego as hostile to gays, I will tell one last story of discomfort
from my time working as a lawyer in New York City. During
the six years that I spent in New York after completing my
clerkship, I worked at three different firms. At the last firm,
I was put in an office that was situated between one of the
partners and a conference room. Because of where I was lo-
cated, I was assigned to share a secretary with the partner
next door. Shortly after I arrived, this partner apparently
learned about my being gay. He called our secretary into his
office and began to grill her about why I had been seated next
to him, whether she knew that I was gay, and how the other
partners could do this to him. She told him that she knew
about my being gay, but said that she didn't understand what
he was making such a big fuss about. Before he let her go
back to work, he ordered her not to answer my phone and
never to do any work for me (an order that she refused to fol-
low).
From that time on, the partner had a wholly irrational
fear of me. Even though I saw him all the time because our
offices were right next to each other, he refused to speak to
me for the first two years that I worked at the firm-no hello,
good-bye, or drop dead. Seeing an opportunity to turn the ta-
bles for once, I exploited his discomfort by being sure to say
hello to him every time I saw him, by holding the door to the
library (which was right across from my office) open for him,
and by asking him how his weekend was when I would see
him at our secretary's desk on Monday mornings. Any of
these gestures would send him running. It also quickly be-
came clear that all I had to do was enter the men's room and I
could clear him (as well as a couple of the other partners) out
immediately.
Eventually, the partner next door found himself in a
situation where he had no choice but to give me an assign-
ment. When this happened, I was called into the office of an-
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other partner with whom I regularly worked. The two were
already seated in his office talking. The partner that I nor-
mally worked with was sitting behind his desk and the part-
ner next door was seated in a chair in front of the desk. The
other chair in front of the desk was piled high with papers
(which was the usual state of affairs in this partner's office),
and I had to sit on the sofa in the back of the office. During
the ten or fifteen minutes that this meeting lasted, the part-
ner next door never turned once to speak to me, and in fact,
never addressed me directly. He spoke only to the partner
who I normally worked with, who then relayed the informa-
tion to me.
After I had completed the assignment, the partner next
door realized that, despite being gay, I could actually do my
job. He began to give me assignments directly, but, when do-
ing so, never crossed the threshold into my office. He would
stand in the doorway, but never get any closer. I can only
imagine what caused him to do this-perhaps he was afraid
that if he got too close I might cause him to become gay. And
if I had a cold, he would stand even farther away. I guess
that in addition to being able to turn men gay, I was also pre-
sumptively an incubator for HIV. When I left the firm to
start teaching, the partner next door did, however, manage to
overcome his irrational fear of me long enough to shake my
hand and wish me luck.
III. THE CODE: A GAY PERSPECTIVE
By recounting this series of experiences, I have tried to
explain why I view society's visceral revulsion to homosexual-
ity as being comprised of a fluid mixture of hostility, bewil-
derment, and discomfort. In this Part, I turn from narrative
to more traditional legal analysis in order to explore how so-
ciety's revulsion manifests itself in the Code's treatment of
gay and lesbian couples. Interesting parallels can be drawn
between some of the experiences that I described in the nar-
rative and the ways in which the tax laws are applied to gay
and lesbian couples. In addition, the Code takes its hostility
toward gay and lesbian couples to a higher level and operates
in much the same fashion as society's ultimate condemnation
of homosexuality-the sodomy statute.29
29. Some commentators have taken critical tax theorists to task for being
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A. Hostility...
For many years, an atmosphere of hostility toward gay
and lesbian couples merely hovered over this "scheme of taxa-
tion where considerations of marital status are pervasive.""
The Code did not itself purport to define marriage; that task
had been left to the states.3 ' But, because no state recognized
same-sex marriage, it was effectively impossible for gay and
lesbian couples to gain recognition as married for federal tax
purposes. Absent recognition of their relationships, these
couples were treated as no more than tax strangers to each
too willing to find discrimination in the Code. See, e.g., Bryce, supra note 16, at
1688 ("The second general observation is that most of [the critical tax] literature
starts with the premise that either women or blacks are oppressed. Starting
with the premise that something is wrong, it is not surprising that things are
found about which to complain."); Zelenak, supra note 3, at 1523 ("The first
problem [with critical tax scholarship] is an overeagerness to accuse the tax
laws of hostility to women or blacks."). This response can only be expected from
adherents of the traditional tax narrative, because critical analysis undermines
the basic tenets of their view of the tax system. The problem, however, with
such blind adherence to the traditional tax narrative is that it runs counter to
the mirror theory of the relationship between law and society, which is well-
accepted among comparative law scholars. See Anthony C. Infanti, The Ethics
of Tax Cloning, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 251, 319-33 (2003). This theory, which might
be described more accurately as a group of theories articulated with differing
levels of strength, posits that law is a reflection of the society that created it.
This theory leaves me with a question for adherents of the traditional tax nar-
rative: If the law (including tax law) is a reflection of the society that created it,
why wouldn't the law reflect the biases and prejudices of that society just as
well as its core values and goals?
30. Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA.
L. REV. 129, 132 (1998). Patricia Cain has stated:
Laws that recognize only heterosexual marriage privilege heterosexu-
als by indicating their relationships are more valuable than same-sex
relationships.... [T]he difference in treatment [in the Code] between
married and unmarried couples, whether the economic effect is benefi-
cial to one class or the other, always carries stigmatic harm to the ex-
tent that the message heard by gay and lesbian taxpayers is that their
relationships do not count.
Cain, Heterosexual Privilege, supra note 20, at 465-66; see also Chase, supra
note 7, at 360 ("For a married couple whose legal status carries substantial
automatic tax preferences and protections, the task of tax planning is less diffi-
cult than for a similarly situated lesbian or gay couple that must resort to com-
plex legal arrangements in an attempt to achieve parity."). Knauer points out
that "an estimated 60 provisions on the income tax side alone" refer to a tax-
payer's marital status. Knauer, supra, at 160.
31. I.R.C. § 7703 (2004); Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th
Cir. 1981) ("We agree with the government's argument that under the Internal
Revenue Code a federal court is bound by state law rather than federal law
when attempting to construe marital status.").
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other.32 The federal government (with the complicity of the
states) had thus quietly banished gay and lesbian couples to
the closet by failing to acknowledge the existence of their re-
lationships.
Congress was content with this arrangement until gay
and lesbian couples began to make some progress in having
their relationships legally recognized.33 In the wake of a 1993
Hawaii Supreme Court decision that for the first time raised
the specter of legalized same-sex marriage,34 Congress decided
to step in" and ensure that gay and lesbian couples would
never be treated as married for federal tax purposes.36 To this
32. Knauer, supra note 30, at 134 ("[S]ame-sex partners always act as
strangers under the tax code regardless of the economic or contractual realities
of their relationship. .. ."); Cain, Heterosexual Privilege, supra note 20, at 466
("The Code presumes that persons are either married or live their lives with a
fair degree of financial separation from others.").
Unmarried heterosexual couples are likewise treated as no more than
tax strangers to each other. Because they share the same status, unmarried
heterosexual couples are subject to the same uncertainties and the same re-
cordkeeping and reporting requirements that apply to gay and lesbian couples,
which are described more fully in the text below. Unmarried heterosexual cou-
ples do, however, have one privilege that gay and lesbian couples do not-the
privilege to choose to get married, have that marriage recognized by the federal
government, and avoid all of these problems. See Cain, Heterosexual Privilege,
supra note 20, at 491.
33. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2914 ("With regard to the issue of same-sex 'marriages,' federal reliance
on state law definitions has not, of course, been at all problematic. Until the
Hawaii situation, there was never any reason to make explicit what has always
been implicit-namely, that only heterosexual couples could get married."); see
also id. at 30, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2934.
34. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
35.
H.R. 3396 is a response to a very particular development in the State of
Hawaii. ... [T]he state courts in Hawaii appear to be on the verge of
requiring that State to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
The prospect of permitting homosexual couples to "marry" in Hawaii
threatens to have very real consequences both on federal law and on
the laws (especially the marriage laws) of the various States.
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
"Because H.R. 3396 was motivated by the Hawaiian lawsuit, the Committee
thinks it is important to discuss that situation in some detail." Id. at 4, re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2908.
36. Id. at 11 n.40, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2915 (referencing
the prepared statement of Lynn D. Wardle); Hearing Before the House Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary on HR. 3396 (Defense
of Marriage Act), 104th Cong. 171 (1996) (prepared statement of Lynn D.
Wardle, Professor of Law, Brigham Young University School of Law) (specifi-
cally enumerating tax benefits as being among the federal benefits that would
have to be extended to same-sex couples if a state were to legalize same-sex
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end, Congress enacted (and President Clinton signed) the De-
fense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), which provides that:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
"spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is
a husband or a wife.
As described by Nancy Knauer, the impact of DOMA on
the application of the Code to gay and lesbian couples was not
accidental:
The exclusion of same-sex couples from the marital provi-
sions is intentional. As a result, there is nothing hidden
or covert about the heterosexist bias of the tax code.
There is no neutral principle at work. The rationale for
the exclusion is not that same-sex couples do not pool their
resources like opposite-sex married couples. Instead, the
rationale for the exclusion is based on the beliefs that a
same-sex couple is not a family, that no civilized society
has ever countenanced such unions, and that our Judeo-
Christian heritage forbids them.38
Thus, not satisfied that a mere slap in the face would
keep gay and lesbian couples in the tax closet, Congress ap-
parently decided to deal them a body blow that would ensure
that its hostility is clear and unmistakable.39
marriage).
37. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)). Following the decision of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodr'dge v. Department of Public Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (2003), and the issuance of thousands of marriage licenses by the
City of San Francisco (before a court-ordered halt to their issuance), Dean E.
Murphy, San Francisco Forced to Halt Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2004, at Al, some conservatives (including President Bush) began a move to en-
shrine the DOMA definition of marriage in the U.S. Constitution, Elisabeth
Bumiller, Same-Sex Marriage: The President; Bush Backs Ban in Constitution
on Gay Mariage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al.
38. Knauer, supra note 30, at 233; see id. at 190 ("Numerous members of
Congress returned again and again to the cost of providing federal benefits to
same-sex partners. The effect of DOMA on the marital provisions of the tax
code was not an unintended consequence."); see supra note 36 and accompany-
ing text.
39.
Civil laws that permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a
collective moral judgment about human sexuality. This judgment
entails both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral
Vol: 44782
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Yet nothing is new or different about this hostility-it is
little more than an extension of the hostility that I have ex-
perienced all my life. The hostility in the Code has simply
moved from the background to the foreground in the same
way that the atmosphere of hostility that I experienced in my
childhood and adolescence (i.e., the childhood taunting, fag
jokes, derogatory remarks, and whispers) gave way to physi-
cal menacing when I went to college and to the violence that
occurred in San Diego before and during the year that I spent
there.
B. Mixed with Bewilderment and Discomfort
Mixed in with this now-explicit hostility are the twin
elements of bewilderment and discomfort. Because Congress
refuses to treat gay and lesbian couples as "married," it be-
comes difficult to settle on an appropriate tax classification
for transactions that occur within the couple. Are they trans-
actions between donor and donee? Creditor and debtor? Em-
ployer and employee? Parent and child? Business partners?"
This is the same difficulty that straight people encounter
when, refusing to use the word "husband" or "wife" (or even
the gender-neutral "spouse"), they grope to find the right
word to describe the relationship between two gay men or two
lesbians. As a result of its aversion to gay sex, straight soci-
ety finds itself struggling once again to shoe-horn gay and
lesbian couples into desexualized categories that just don't
comport with reality." These categories are simply the tax
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality. As Representative Henry Hyde,
the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, stated during the Subcom-
mittee markup of H.R. 3396: "[S]ame-sex marriage, if sanctified by the
law, if approved by the law, legitimates a public union, a legal status
that most people ... felt ought to be illegitimate .... And in so doing it
trivializes the legitimate status of marriage and demands it by putting
a stamp of approval.., on a union that many people.., think is im-
moral." It is both inevitable and entirely appropriate that the law
should reflect such moral judgments. H.R. 3396 serves the govern-
ment's legitimate interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings
reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws.
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 15-16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2919-20 (footnotes omitted).
40. See Chase, supra note 7, at 373-89.
41. Cain, Heterosexual Pivilege, supra note 20, at 466 ("The reality is that
many same-sex, committed couples do not live in a world of financial separation.
The tax laws, in effect, force them into a reporting stance that is not reflective of
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versions of the desexualized euphemisms (e.g., "friend,"
"partner," and "significant other") that gay and lesbian cou-
ples encounter in daily life.
In the context of taxation, this bewilderment and discom-
fort have more than just symbolic consequences. During the
nine years that Michael and I were together, we pooled our
income (which, as might be expected, was never equal) and
shared all of our expenses. 42 All of our income went into our
joint checking or savings account, and we held all of our in-
vestments (including our home) in joint tenancies. This ar-
rangement had nothing to do with tax planning (which would
probably be obvious to anyone who has read anything on tax
planning for gays and lesbians),43 but had everything to do
with how we perceived our relationship and how we wanted it
to be perceived by others. Whenever, like us, a gay or lesbian
couple pools all or a portion of its income and investments
and one partner' earns more than the other, the couple must
confront the enigmatic task of characterizing the annual net
transfer from the higher-earning partner to the lower-earning
their day-to-day lives."); Patricia A. Cain, The Income Tax: Taxing Lesbians, 6
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 471, 472 (1997) [hereinafter Cain, Taxing
Lesbians] ("The law generally refuses to recognize their relationships and the
tax law is no different. Every year when they [lesbian couples] file income tax
returns, they are required to fill out forms that force them into separate spheres
from each other as though their lives were lived separately." (alteration in
original)).
42. Although Nancy Knauer has stated that "there is little evidence on the
pooling patterns of same-sex couples," she does cite two sources that indicate
that a significant number of gays and lesbians favor pooling. Knauer, supra
note 30, at 155 & n.112. In a more recent article, Patricia Cain cites a 1998
survey and, on the basis of the results of that survey, asserts that "it is fair to
conclude that same-sex couples share ownership of assets at a much higher rate
than opposite-sex unmarried couples." Cain, Death Taxes, supra note 21, at
689-90.
43. See, e.g., Cain, Death Taxes, supra note 21, at 694-95 ("[R]esponsible
estate planning experts always advise clients to sever their joint tenancies and
create revocable trusts."); Patricia A. Cain, Tax and Financial Planning for
Same-Sex Couples: Recommended Reading, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 613 passim
(1998).
44. Despite my dislike for such desexualized euphemisms, I feel constrained
here to use the term "partner" to refer to the individual members of a gay or
lesbian couple both because it is, in my experience, the most commonly-used
term in everyday speech and because it will help to sharpen the tax distinction
between straight couples and gay and lesbian couples in the remainder of the
article. Hopefully more appropriate, non-desexualized terminology will come to
replace the now-common "partner" in everyday speech. The development of
such terminology is, however, quite beyond the scope of this article.
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partner (the "net interspousal transfer") both for income and
45for gift tax purposes.
For income tax purposes, the higher-earning partner
might be treated as making a gift each time the utility bills
are paid, a trip is made to the grocery store, or a withdrawal
is made from the ATM.46 If so, the higher-earning partner
would continue to pay tax on her wages,47 and the lower-
earning partner would have no income tax inclusion as a re-
sult of receiving those gifts. 4 Alternatively, the pooling might
be characterized as a support arrangement. 9  In that case,
the higher-earning partner would still be subject to tax on her
wages, ° while the lower-earning partner would again have no
income tax inclusion as a result of receiving the support pay-
ments.51 A more frightening alternative would require both
partners to pay tax on the portion of the higher-earning part-
ner's income that is transferred to the lower-earning partner
-on the ground that it technically constitutes "income" to
each of them."2 Yet another possibility is that the net inter-
spousal transfer could represent some combination of the
above (e.g., part support, part gift; part support, part income;
or part gift, part income).
For gift tax purposes, a net interspousal transfer might
be treated as a taxable gift.53 Or, depending on the facts and
45. Although a measure of uncertainty may also face gay and lesbian cou-
ples in other contexts (e.g., the dissolution of their relationship), I focus here
only on the application of the tax laws to gay and lesbian couples while their
relationship is on-going. For discussions addressing the uncertainty surround-
ing the appropriate tax characterization of transfers attendant to the dissolu-
tion of a relationship, see Cain, Death Taxes, supra note 21, at 482-83; Chase,
supra note 7, at 389-91; Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth
Transfers Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1240, 1284-90
(1980).
46. See Cain, Same-Sex Couples, supra note 7, at 114-15, for an argument
that gift characterization is most appropriate in the context of a relationship in
which one partner earns significantly more than the other. See also Cain, Tax-
ing Lesbians, supra note 41, at 476 (reiterating her belief that such transfers
should be characterized as gifts).
47. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
48. I.R.C. § 102 (2004).
49. Cain, Same-Sex Couples, supra note 7, at 115-16.
50. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114-15.
51. 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 11, 10.2.6, at 10-22 to 10-23; Cain,
Same-Sex Couples, supra note 7, at 116.
52. Wolk, supra note 45, at 1244-62; see also Cain, Taxing Lesbians, supra
note 41, at 476.
53. See Cain, Same-Sex Couples, supra note 7, at 125; Knauer, supra note
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circumstances, the transfer might be characterized, in whole
or in part, as a non-taxable payment made in exchange for
rendering domestic services or for furnishing some other con-
sideration in money or money's worth.' Alternatively, the
net interspousal transfer might be characterized as a non-
taxable support payment. 55 Yet another possibility is that the
transfer could represent some combination of the above (e.g.,
part non-taxable support payment, part taxable gift or part
non-taxable payment for services, part taxable gift).
If a net interspousal transfer were treated as a taxable
gift, then, for gay and lesbian couples, the gift tax would ef-
fectively be transformed from a wealth transfer tax into a
consumption tax. Gay and lesbian couples would not only
have to worry about paying gift tax on transfers of stocks and
securities, real property, and other assets that they accumu-
late as they grow old together, but would also have to worry
about paying gift tax on every rent or mortgage payment,
every purchase of clothing, and even food.5"
As soon as the total of wealth transmission and consump-
tion transfers from the higher-earning partner to the lower-
earning partner exceeded the gift tax annual exclusion, 7 the
higher-earning partner would begin spending down her life-
30, at 174; Wolk, supra note 45, at 1275-81. As Cain explains, if a net inter-
spousal transfer is characterized as a gift for income tax purposes, see supra
note 46, "consistency would seem to require that any such payments be charac-
terized as taxable gifts" for gift tax purposes. Cain, Same-Sex Couples, supra
note 7, at 125. Cain argues, however, that consistency should not control and
that the net interspousal transfer should not constitute a taxable gift. Id. at
125-29; cf infra note 64 and accompanying text (indicating that consistency is
not required).
54. Wolk, supra note 45, at 1277-78. For gift tax purposes, "[a] considera-
tion not reducible to a value in money or money's worth, as love and affection,
promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded, and the entire value of
the property transferred constitutes the amount of the gift." Treas. Reg. §
25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992); see also Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945);
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
55. See Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414; see also Cain, Same-Sex Couples,
supra note 7, at 126-29; Knauer, supra note 30, at 174.
56. See Cain, Death Taxes, supra note 21, at 696; Cain, Heterosexual Privi-
lege, supra note 20, at 474-76. However, gay and lesbian couples would not
have to worry about certain payments for tuition or medical care. See I.R.C.
§ 2503(e) (2004).
57. I.R.C. § 2503(b). The inflation-adjusted annual gift tax exclusion for
2003 was $11,000. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 709, at 3 (2003).
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time unified credit of $1 million.58 Any gay or lesbian couple
with jointly held property and a significant disparity in in-
come could easily find itself exceeding the annual exclusion
each year.59 Once the unified credit has been exhausted,
which is a distinct possibility over the course of a long-term
relationship (or a series of long-term relationships), 6° the
higher-earning partner would begin paying gift tax on both
wealth transmission and consumption transfers at a rate of
forty-one percent. 61 Thus, for gay and lesbian couples, gift
taxation cannot be dismissed as the product of an overactive
or misdirected imagination; rather, it is a very real possibility
whose importance should not be trivialized or ignored."
Furthermore, when the income and gift tax consequences
of a net interspousal transfer are considered together, the tax
cost may be even higher than it initially appears. Because
the income tax and the gift tax operate independently, the
characterization of a net interspousal transfer need not be
consistent across these taxes.n In other words, a net inter-
58. I.R.C. §§ 2010(c), 2505(a) (2004).
59. Even in Pittsburgh, which has a modest cost of living compared to other
areas in the country, one-half of my annual mortgage payment (including the
escrow for real property taxes and insurance) is nearly $9,000. See MERCER
HUMAN RES. CONSULTING, WORLD-WIDE COST OF LIVING SURVEY (2003), avail-
able at http://www.finfacts.ie/costoflivingl.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2004) (indi-
cating that Pittsburgh was ranked nineteenth out of the twenty-one U.S. cities
included in the worldwide survey).
60. See Cain, Heterosexua Privilege, supra note 20, at 475-76.
61. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FORM 709, at 11 (2003). From 2003 through 2009, the gift tax rate schedule will
be adjusted to take into account the progressive lowering of the top marginal
gift tax rate that was prescribed by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recon-
ciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 511(c), 115 Stat. 38, 70 (2001) [here-
inafter EGTRRA 2001]. In 2010, the top marginal gift tax rate will equal the
top income tax rate of 35%. I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (2004); EGTRRA 2001, supra,
§§ 511(d), (f)(3), 115 Stat. at 70-71. In 2011, however, the top marginal gift tax
rate will return to its pre-EGTRRA 2001 level of 55%, unless Congress inter-
venes before then and makes the reduction permanent. I.R.C. §§ 2001(c),
2502(a) (2001) (prior to amendment by EGTRRA 2001); EGTRRA 2001, supra,
§ 901, 115 Stat. at 150.
62. Cf Johnson, supra note 4, at 1776 ("It is possible to overstate the sig-
nificance of some of the asserted advantages available to married couples. For
example, the estate and gift tax considerations mentioned above do not matter
for the clear majority of Americans, including (presumably) the majority of
same-sex partners."); Zelenak, supra note 3, at 1549 ("But in the overall femi-
nist scheme of things any arguable injustice caused by [the qualified terminable
interest property rules in the estate tax] to affluent (and overwhelmingly white)
widows is simply trivial.").
63. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 69 n.6 (1962) ("In inter-
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spousal transfer might be characterized as income to both
partners for income tax purposes and as a taxable gift from
the higher-earning partner to the lower-earning partner for
gift tax purposes.' Consequently, a portion of the income of
the higher-earning partner might be subject to triple taxa-
tion.
C. ... and Back to Hostility Again
In a mark of the fluidity of the mixture, this intolerable
preting the particular income tax provisions here involved, we find ourselves
unfettered by the language and considerations ingrained in the gift and estate
tax statutes."); Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942).
In Beck's Estate, the court noted:
Perhaps to assuage the feelings and aid the understanding of affected
taxpayers, Congress might use different symbols to describe the tax-
able conduct in the several statutes, calling it a 'gift' in the gift tax law,
a 'gaft' in the income tax law, and a 'geft' in the estate tax law.
Id.
64. See Cain, Same-Sex Couples, supra note 7, at 124-25; Chase, supra note
7, at 375.
65. To get an idea of what triple taxation might look like, consider a simple
example. Assume that the higher-earning partner of a single-earner lesbian
couple has $100,000 in income for the 2003 taxable year. The couple is ad-
vanced in years, has paid off its home, and has no children (or, at least, no chil-
dren at home). The two women pool their income and share their expenses
equally. Under this scenario, the higher-earning partner will pay $19,708 in
income tax on her income assuming that she takes the standard deduction and
two personal exemptions. Ignoring state taxes, that leaves the couple with
$80,292 on which to subsist.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that one half of the higher-earning
partner's after-tax income (or $40,146) is the amount of the net interspousal
transfer for the year. Using average tax dollars, the transfer has already borne
$9,854 (half of $19,708) in income tax in the hands of the higher earning part-
ner (i.e., the before-tax transfer was $50,000, or one-half of the higher-earning
partner's gross income). In the hands of the lower-earning partner, this $40,146
will be subject to another round of income tax, with the lower-earning partner
being required to pay $6,659 in income tax on the transfer (assuming no other
income, no personal exemption, and a standard deduction of only $750). Assum-
ing that the higher-earning partner has just exhausted her gift tax unified
credit, $29,146 of the net interspousal transfer ($40,146 less the $11,000 annual
exclusion) will be subject to gift tax at a rate of 41%, producing an additional
$11,950 in tax.
In total, the net interspousal transfer will have borne $28,463 in income
and gift tax, for an effective tax rate of 56.9% ($28,463 divided by $50,000). In
contrast, a married couple's tax bill on the same transfer (based on average tax
dollars and a single round of income tax) would have been only $7,554, for an
effective tax rate of 15.1% ($7,554 divided by $50,000). All inflation-adjusted
amounts referenced here were taken from FEDERAL INCOME TAX: CODE AND
REGULATIONS: SELECTED SECTIONS, at ix-xii (Martin B. Dickinson ed., 2003-
2004).
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level of uncertainty opens the door to a further, and arguably
more insidious, form of hostility. Faced with a veritable con-
stellation of potential tax characterizations, gay and lesbian
couples must examine all of the possibilities and settle on an
appropriate combination of income and gift tax characteriza-
tions for their net interspousal transfers. Their task is not
made any easier by Congress or the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"), both of whom have been conspicuously silent on the
question of how the tax laws should be applied to gay and
lesbian couples. Although Congress took the time to debate
and decide that gay and lesbian couples should never be
treated as married for federal tax purposes,66 it did not spend
any time spelling out how to treat couples who do not qualify
for the marital provisions in the Code.6" The IRS has made no
attempt to fill this gap in the application of the tax laws ei-
ther; it has been noticeably remiss in issuing public guid-
ance68 to help gay and lesbian couples comply with the tax
laws and avoid the unnecessary incurrence of "additional,
real, out-of-pocket costs" in seeking "tax advice from lawyers
and accountants."69
66. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S10,121 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Ashcroft); 142 CONG. REC. H7,490 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of
Mr. Bryant), id at H7495-97 (statement of Mr. Jackson); id. at H7,499-7,500
(statement of Mr. Frank).
67.
Congress has never taken any positive action toward the recognition of
same-sex relationships under the tax law. For example, during the de-
bate over DOMA, Congress debated whether same-sex couples should
be spouses and never considered what default rules might apply to
them if they are not treated as spouses. Thus, the message from Con-
gress, as currently embedded in the tax laws, is that same-sex couples
are not worthy of spousal treatment and, furthermore, their treatment
under the tax laws is not even worthy of discussion.
Cain, Heterosexual Privilege, supra note 20, at 493.
68.
While it is easier to see that stigmatic harm occurs as a result of the
explicit discrimination against gay men and lesbians in DOMA, harm
also occurs because neither Congress nor the IRS has chosen to give
any attention to the tax situation of same-sex committed partners.
There are no published revenue rulings, IRS publications, or official
guidelines of any sort that relate to a single tax issue affecting same-
sex partners.... The IRS's silence on these matters is astounding
given the frequency with which these matters are debated at national
conferences and in academic journals.
Id. at 491-93.
69. Id. at 494.
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1. Burden of Proof and Penalties
Yet, despite this lack of guidance, the tax laws place the
burden on gay and lesbian couples to prove that their chosen
treatment is correct.7 ' The tax laws additionally attach a pre-
sumption of correctness to whatever treatment the IRS deems
appropriate-after the fact and without any advance public
notice." Because of the need to shoe-horn interspousal trans-
fers into categories that don't quite fit, these burdens-the
burden of proof and the burden of going forward with evi-
dence-will prove difficult for gay and lesbian couples to bear.
If they fail to carry one or both of these burdens, gay and les-
bian couples may find that they are liable not only for addi-
tional tax, but also for one or more of the civil penalties au-
thorized by the Code. The potentially applicable penalties
include:
Failure to File. The Code imposes a penalty for failure
timely to file an income or gift tax return.72 The penalty is
equal to 5% of the amount required to be shown as tax on the
return (after the application of any credits that the taxpayer
may claim).73 The 5% penalty is imposed for each month (or
fraction thereof) that the return is late." The total penalty
cannot, however, exceed 25% in the aggregate.5
Failure to Pay. The Code imposes a penalty for failure to
pay any amount of tax required to be shown on an income or
gift tax return, but which has not been shown.7 ' The penalty
only applies if the payment is not made within 21 calendar
days from the date of notice and demand (or 10 business days
70. See I.R.C. § 142(a)(1) (2004) ("The burden of proof shall be upon the
[taxpayer], except as otherwise provided by statute or determined by the Court;
and except that, in respect of any new matter, increases in deficiency, and af-
firmative defenses, pleaded in the answer, it shall be upon the [IRS]."); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976) ("In a refund suit the taxpayer bears
the burden of proving the amount he is entitled to recover."). It is unlikely that
gay and lesbian couples will be able to avail themselves of recently-enacted bur-
den-shifting provisions because of the problems that they will encounter in sat-
isfying the Code's recordkeeping requirements (which are described more fully
in the text below). See I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1)-(2)(A) (2004).
71. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) ("[The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue's] ruling has the support of a presumption of correctness,
and the petitioner has the burden of proving it to be wrong.").
72. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (2004).
73. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2000).
74. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 6651(a)(3).
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if the amount exceeds $100,000)." The penalty is equal to
0.5% of the amount demanded for each month (or fractionS 78
thereof) that the failure to pay continues. The total penalty
cannot, however, exceed 25% in the aggregate. 9
Negligence Penalty. The Code imposes a penalty for neg-
ligence or disregard of rules or regulations.80 "Negligence" is
defined to include "any failure to make a reasonable attempt
to comply with the provisions" of the Code."' "Disregard" is
defined to include "any careless, reckless, or intentional dis-
regard.",2 The penalty is equal to 20% of the portion of any
underpayment that is attributable to negligence or disregard
of rules or regulations. 3
Substantial Understatement Penalty. The Code imposes
a penalty for substantial understatement of income tax.84 An
understatement of income tax is "substantial" if it exceeds the
greater of (i) 10% of the tax required to be shown on the re-
turn or (ii) $5,000. s" The penalty is equal to 20% of the por-
tion of any underpayment that is attributable to the substan-
tial understatement 6
Other more obscure penalties may also be imposed on gay
and lesbian couples in connection with net interspousal trans-
77. Id.
78. Id. Under certain circumstances, the amount of the penalty is increased
to 1% of the amount demanded. See id. § 6651(d).
79. Id.
80. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (2004). The penalty for disregarding rules or regula-
tions will not apply if the taxpayer adequately discloses her position on a Form
8275 or Form 8275-R, as appropriate, the taxpayer has a reasonable basis for
her position, the position is properly substantiated, and the taxpayer has kept
adequate books and records with respect to the position. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
3(c) (as amended in 1998).
81. I.R.C. § 6662(c).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 6662(a).
84. Id. § 6662(b)(2). An item will not be included in the "understatement" if
the taxpayer has "substantial authority" for the item or if the item is adequately
disclosed on a Form 8275 or Form 8275-R, as appropriate, (or, if permitted by
the IRS, on the return itself) and the item has a reasonable basis, is properly
substantiated, and the taxpayer has kept adequate books and records with re-
spect to the item. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)-(e) (as amended
in 1998).
85. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A).
86. Id. § 6662(a). If a portion of an underpayment is due to negligence or
disregard of rules or regulations and also constitutes a "substantial" under-
statement, the total penalty on that portion of the underpayment is limited to
20% (i.e., there is no stacking of accuracy-related penalties under § 6662).
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c) (as amended in 1998).
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fers. Because they cannot be considered married for federal
tax purposes, gay and lesbian couples are subject to easily-
overlooked information reporting and withholding require-
ments if they jointly hold interest-bearing investments (e.g., a
savings account or certificate of deposit). 7  Normally, the
bank will send the couple a Form 1099-INT at the beginning
of the year reporting the amount of interest paid to them dur-
ing the previous year. The couple then uses this information
to calculate the amount of interest that must be reported on
their respective federal income tax returns. As is plainly
stated on the face of the Form 1099-INT, a copy of the form is
also sent to the IRS.8 Most joint account holders probably
(wrongly) believe that the reporting by the bank fully informs
the IRS of the interest income received by both partners.
Even though both partners' names are listed on the form
sent to them (and to the IRS) by the bank, the Code requires
the partner listed first on that statement to file with the IRS
another Form 1099-INT (as well as a Form 1096) reporting
the other partner's share of the interest income reported to
them by the bank.89 The first-listed partner must furnish a
copy of this Form 1099-INT to the other partner." Beginning
87. It is worth noting that the opposite rule applies for purposes of reporting
dividend payments. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6042-2(a)(2) (as amended in 2000).
88. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1099-INT:
INTEREST INCOME, at Copy B (2003) ("This is important tax information and is
being furnished to the Internal Revenue Service.").
89. See I.R.C. § 6049(a)(2) (2004) (requiring middlemen to report interest
payments); Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4(a)(2)(ii), -4(c)(3)(i) (as amended in 2002) (also
requiring middlemen to report interest payments). Treasury Regulations
§ 1.6049-4(f)(4)(i) (as amended in 2002) provides:
A person shall be considered to be a middleman as to any portion of an
interest payment made to such person which portion is actually owned
by another person, whether or not the other person's name is also
shown on the information return filed with respect to such interest
payment, except that a husband or wife will not be considered as acting
in the capacity of a middleman with respect to his or her spouse.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FORMS 1099, 1098, 5498, AND W-2G, at GEN-6 (2003), states:
Generally, if you receive a Form 1099 for amounts that actually belong
to another person, you are considered a nominee recipient. You must
file a Form 1099 (the same type of Form 1099 you received) for each of
the other owners showing the amounts allocable to each. You must
also furnish a Form 1099 to each of the other owners. File the new
Form 1099 with Form 1096 with the Internal Revenue Service Center
for your area .... A husband or wife is not required to file a nominee
return to show amounts owned by the other.
90. See I.R.C. § 6049(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-6 (as amended in 1999).
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in 2003, the first-listed partner is also required to withhold
tax at the flat rate of 28% on the other partner's share of the
interest income (and, of course, pay it over to the IRS),9
unless the other partner provides her with a Form W-9 in
which she furnishes her taxpayer identification number, cer-
tifies under penalties of perjury that her taxpayer identifica-
tion number is correct, and further certifies that she is not
subject to withholding due to notified payee underreporting.9 2
These duplicative and burdensome information reporting
and withholding requirements are not imposed on married
couples.93 Gay and lesbian couples that ignore or overlook
these information reporting and/or withholding requirements
risk the imposition of one or more of the following additional
penalties:
Failure to File Correct Information Returns. The Code
imposes a penalty for failure timely to file correct information
returns.94 The penalty is $50 per return, up to a maximum of
$250,000 per year;95 however, if the failure is due to inten-
tional disregard of the filing requirement, then the penalty is
$100 per return or 10% of the aggregate amount of the items
required to be reported, whichever is greater, and there is no
overall limitation on the amount of the penalty.96
Failure to Furnish Payee Statements. The Code imposes
a penalty for failure timely to furnish correct payee informa-
91. See I.R.C. § 6302 (2004); Treas. Reg. § 31.6302-4 (1993); Treas. Reg.
§ 31.3406(h)-2(f)(3) (as amended in 2002) (incorporating by reference the deposit
rules of § 6302).
92. See I.R.C. § 3406(a)(1) (2004); Treas. Reg. § 31.3406(a)-i (1995); Treas.
Reg. § 31.3406(a)-2(a) (as amended in 2002); Treas. Reg. § 31.3406(b)(2)-1(a)(1)
(1995); Treas. Reg. § 31.3406(d)-l(a), -1(b)(3) (1995); Treas. Reg. § 31.3406(h)-3
(as amended in 2000); see also Information Reporting Requirements for Certain
Payments Made on Behalf of Another Person, Payments to Joint Payees, and
Payments of Gross Proceeds from Sales Involving Investment Advisers, 65 Fed.
Reg. 61,292, 61,293 (proposed Oct. 17, 2000) (codified at Treas. Reg.
§ 31.3406(a)-2) (indicating that the change in the definition of "middleman,"
which became effective January 1, 2003, was intended to conform the definition
of that term in the regulations to the definition used in § 3406(h) and the rele-
vant information reporting sections of the Code).
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4(f)(4)(i) (as amended in 2002).
94. I.R.C. §§ 6721, 6724(d)(1)(A)(iv) (2004).
95. Id. § 6721(a)(1). The penalty is reduced if the failure is corrected no
later than August 1 of the calendar year in which the return is required to be
filed. Id. § 6721(b). Lower overall limitations are available for small taxpayers.
Id. § 6721(d).
96. Id. § 6721(e).
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tion statements.97 The penalty is $50 per return, up to a
maximum of $100,000 per year;9" however, if the failure is due
to intentional disregard of the requirement to furnish a payee
statement, then the penalty is $100 per return or 10% of the
aggregate amount of the items required to be reported,
whichever is greater, and there is no overall limitation on the
amount of the penalty.99
Failure to Comply with Other Information Reporting Re-
quirement. The Code imposes a penalty on the other partner
if she fails to provide her taxpayer identification number to
the first-listed partner upon request (because it must be in-
cluded on the Form 1099-INT). 1° The penalty is $50 for each
failure, up to a maximum of $100,000 per year.1 1
Failure to Deposit. The Code imposes a penalty for fail-
ure timely to deposit taxes as required by the Code or the
Treasury Regulations. 1°' The penalty is imposed on a sliding
scale depending on the length of the delinquency; it ranges
from 2% of the underpayment (for a failure that continues for
less than 5 days) up to 10% (for a failure that continues for
more than 15 days). 10 3
A taxpayer can avoid these penalties if she can demon-
strate that (i) she had reasonable cause for her failure" and
(ii) depending on the penalty, she either acted in good faith"
or did not willfully neglect her legal obligations. 06 To estab-
lish the existence of reasonable cause, the taxpayer must
generally demonstrate that she exercised ordinary care and
prudence in ascertaining and complying with her tax obliga-
97. Id. §§ 6722, 6724(d)(2)(H) (2004).
98. I.R.C. § 6722(a).
99. Id. § 6722(c).
100. Id. §§ 6723, 6724(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2004); see also id. § 6109(a)(2) (2004);
Treas. Reg. § 301.6109-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2003).
101. I.R.C. § 6723 (2004).
102. Id. § 6656(a).
103. Id. § 6656(b)(1)(A)(iii). Under specified circumstances, the amount of
the penalty is increased to 15% of the underpayment. See id. § 6656(b)(1)(B).
104. Id. §§ 6651(a)(1)-(a)(3), 6656(a), 6664(c), 6724(a) (2004).
105. Id. § 6664(c). Two commentators have defined "good faith" as "an honest
belief, without knowledge of circumstances that would put the taxpayer under a
duty to inquire further, and free of any intention to defraud." Alan J. Tarr &
Carol F. Burger, Civil Tax Penalties, 634 TAx MGM'T INTL J. (BNA) A-70, at A-
73 (Apr. 9, 2001).
106. See I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1), (a)(3), 6656(a), 6724(a). The Supreme Court
has defined "willful neglect" as "a conscious, intentional failure or reckless indif-
ference." United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985).
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ions. 7  Ignorance of the law, by itself, does not constitute
reasonable cause for failure to comply with the tax laws. 18
When it comes to grappling with the uncertainty sur-
107. See Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002) ("Because the same terms are used
[sic] § 6651(a)(1) and § 6656(a) to define the circumstances in which a taxpayer
is not required to pay additions, we see no reason why 'reasonable cause' and
'willful neglect' should not be interpreted consistently.").
If the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence and was
nevertheless unable to file the return within the prescribed time, then
the delay is due to a reasonable cause. A failure to pay will be
considered to be due to reasonable cause to the extent that the
taxpayer has made a satisfactory showing that he exercised ordinary
business care and prudence in providing for payment of his tax liability
and was nevertheless either unable to pay the tax or would suffer an
undue hardship ....
Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2000).
Acting in a responsible manner means ... [t]hat the filer exercised rea-
sonable care, which is that standard of care that a reasonably prudent
person would use under the circumstances in the course of its business
in determining its filing obligations and in handling account informa-
tion such as account numbers and balances....
Id. § 301.6724-1(d)(1)(i) (as amended in 2003).
Notwithstanding the use of the same two words (i.e., "reasonable
cause"), the Treasury Regulations promulgated under § 6664 interpret this
phrase somewhat differently than the regulations cited in the previous para-
graph. Treasury Regulations § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 1998) does not use
the "ordinary care and prudence" language, but instead provides that "the most
important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's
proper tax liability." Among the examples of situations in which reasonable
cause and good faith may be indicated, the Treasury Regulations include "an
honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the
facts and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education of
the taxpayer." Id. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 1998).
108.
As a general rule, taxpayers are charged with knowledge of the law.
While a showing of good faith by the taxpayer may preclude the exis-
tence of fraud, good faith does not always negate negligence. Although
taxpayers are not subject to the addition to tax for negligence where
they make honest mistakes in complex matters, they are required to
take reasonable steps to determine the law and to comply with it.
Niedringhaus v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. 202, 222 (1992) (citations omitted); see also
Heller v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1338, 1346 (1980), affd without opinion, 679
F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The duty of timely filing a tax return is the personal
duty of a taxpayer, and the taxpayer cannot excuse himself from the proper per-
formance of that duty by claiming to be unaware of the correct due date."); Beck
Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 840, 859 (1957) ("The personal good
faith belief that the taxpayer is not required to file an excess profits tax return
is insufficient alone to discharge the addition to tax under I.R.C.
§ 291(a) (1939)."); Marilyn E. Brookens, The Section 6651(a)(1) Penalty for Late
Filed Tax Returns: Reasonable Cause and Unreasoned Decisions, 35 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 183, 191-93 (1985).
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rounding the tax characterization of net interspousal trans-
fers, gay and lesbian couples likely fall into one of three cate-
gories: (i) the blissfully ignorant, who are simply unaware of
this tax issue; (ii) the informed and well-intentioned, who are
aware of this tax issue and make their best effort at compli-
ance; or (iii) the informed but civilly disobedient, who are
aware of this tax issue but purposefully refuse to allow them-
selves to be made a party to their own oppression. 9 Only gay
and lesbian couples that fall in the second category (i.e., the
informed and well-intentioned) will be able to avail them-
selves of the reasonable cause exception, because they will
have made a good faith (albeit erroneous) attempt to comply
with an uncertain area of the law."' Couples in the other two
categories will be faced with penalties either because they
were ignorant of the law or because they were aware of the
law and ignored it-neither of which constitutes reasonable
cause.
If they are liable for additional tax, penalties, or both,
then the couple will also be liable for interest on the addi-
tional tax due and on any penalties-compounded daily"'
The Code's use of compound interest imposes a heavier bur-
den on the taxpayer than using simple interest would, espe-
cially given the length of time needed to identify and resolve a
dispute with the IRS."' Taken together, compound interest
and penalties can quickly increase the size of a tax bill. For
example, after five years, a $100,000 deficiency subject to a
20% negligence penalty and compound interest at a rate of
109. For an example of tax civil disobedience spurred by the Code's treatment
of gay and lesbian couples, see United States v. Mueller, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) T50,205 (7th Cir. 2000); Mueller v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (2001),
afTd, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,505 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1003 (2002); and Mueller v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000), affd, 2001-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T50,391 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 887 (2001).
110.
On the other hand, ignorance of the law in conjunction with other facts
and circumstances, including the taxpayer's knowledge, may support a
claim of reasonable cause. For example, where the IRS has not pro-
vided any guidance as to difficult and complex issues, reasonable cause
may exist for a position taken in good faith.
Tarr & Burger, supra note 105, at A-76 (footnote omitted).
111. I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6622 (2004).
112. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 6.04[1], at
6-65 (rev. 2d ed. 2002); Gerald W. Padwe, Tax Clinic, 14 TAx ADVISER 144, 145
(1983).
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5%113 would result in a liability of $154,080.41-an amount
that is more than 150% of the initial tax deficiency.
2. Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements
Even if a gay or lesbian couple manages to win the battle
with the IRS over an alleged failure appropriately to charac-
terize a net interspousal transfer, the couple may find that
the war with the IRS is far from over. Until now, we have
considered only the need for gay and lesbian couples to ascer-
tain the amount of, and to settle on an appropriate tax char-
acterization for, net interspousal transfers. Their obligations
under the tax laws do not, however, end there. The Code also
imposes on gay and lesbian couples several recordkeeping and
reporting requirements that are ostensibly designed to help
the IRS verify the accuracy of the couple's returns."4
For income tax purposes, each taxpayer is required to
"keep such permanent books of account or records, including
inventories, as are sufficient to establish the amount of gross
income, deductions, credits, or other matters required to be
shown by such person in any return of such tax or informa-
tion."'15 Likewise, for gift tax purposes, each taxpayer is re-
quired to "keep such permanent books of account or records
as are necessary to establish the amount of his total gifts ...
together with the deductions allowable in determining the
amount of his taxable gifts, and the other information re-
quired to be shown in a gift tax return.""6 Moreover, if a tax-
payer makes gifts to a person in excess of the annual exclu-
sion, she is required to list separately on her gift tax return
each and every gift made during the calendar year to that
person, including gifts that are not taxed because of the an-
nual exclusion. 11
These requirements impose a Sisyphean compliance bur-
den on any gay or lesbian couple who pools income and shares
113. Rev. Rul. 2003-63, 2003-25 I.R.B. 1037 (indicating that a five percent
interest rate applies to underpayments beginning July 1, 2003).
114. I.R.C. § 6001 (2004).
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) (as amended in 1990).
116. Id. § 25.6001-1(a) (as amended in 1977).
117. Id. § 25.6019-3(a) (as amended in 1994) ("The return must set forth each
gift made during the calendar year... that... is to be included in computing
taxable gifts .... "); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FORM 709, at 6 (2003) (indicating that all gifts must be separately listed, even
those to be excluded by reason of the annual exclusion).
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expenses. The Code essentially requires these couples to keep
records documenting every penny that they spend, save, or
give away to third parties.'"" Every trip to the grocery store,
the clothing store, and the bank must be documented to de-
termine who spent what and on whom. Without these re-
cords, the couple will find it difficult, if not impossible, to
counter an assertion by the IRS that (i) the net interspousal
transfer is larger than claimed by the couple; (ii) for income
tax purposes, a larger portion of the transfer should be
treated as taxable income (as opposed to a non-taxable gift or
support payment); and/or (iii) for gift tax purposes, a larger
portion of the transfer should be treated as a taxable gift (as
opposed to a non-taxable support payment).
Simply put, these recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments are demeaning and oppressive. Think for a moment of
the mountain of shopping receipts that you collect every
month. Then think of having to catalogue each of these re-
ceipts contemporaneously according to what was spent and on
whom. Then think about having to tally up the total at the
end of the year. Then think about having to list every one of
these transactions on a tax return, showing the particulars of
what was given, by whom, and to whom. Finally, think about
having to find a place to store this small mountain of paper
for six or more years (depending on the relevant tax statute of
limitations)'19 in order to provide support for the claimed
amount and tax characterization of any net interspousal
transfer.
For gay and lesbian couples, these recordkeeping and re-
porting requirements represent not only an onerous burden,
but also a severe invasion of privacy. After Lawrence v.
118. See Cain, Death Taxes, supra note 21, at 696 (describing the plight of
Alice and Barb). When Alice's estate was audited for estate tax purposes,
the auditing agent took the position that since Alice was the wealthy
partner, everything she paid for over the forty years that benefited
Barb was an adjustable [sic] taxable gift. Thus, Alice's ownership of
the couple's residence which was used by Barb created an adjusted tax-
able gift. Vacation trips for the two of them paid out of Alice's funds
created an adjusted taxable gift. Entertainment expenses and meals at
fancy restaurants - all items of joint consumption - were proposed as
adjusted taxable gifts.
Id.
119. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 552,
RECORDKEEPING FOR INDMDUALS 6 (1999).
798 Vol: 44
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Texas,20 the government can no longer break into our bed-
rooms to determine with whom and how we have sex, but it
can still use the Code to knock on the front door, come in, and
probe our every move (financial and otherwise) with our
partners. No straight couple is (or likely ever will be) re-
quired to put up with this level of intrusion into its relation-
ship.121
Such a crushing (not to mention insulting) recordkeeping
and reporting burden can only breed non-compliance. Non-
compliant gay and lesbian couples will again likely fall into
one of three categories: (i) the blissfully ignorant, who simply
have no idea that the recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments exist; (ii) the informed and well-intentioned, who at-
tempt to comply, but (as can only be expected) fail to do so; or
(iii) the informed but civilly disobedient, who are aware of the
requirements but purposefully refuse to comply because they
do not wish to be made a party to their own oppression.
1
'
2
Whatever the reason, this non-compliance with the record-
keeping and reporting requirements may give the IRS an op-
portunity to increase the amount of additional tax owed and
to impose penalties. 23
For those who either throw up their hands at the impos-
sibility of the task or who refuse to acquiesce in the oppres-
sion, the specter of criminal liability is added to the array of
civil penalties discussed above. Gay and lesbian couples who
are aware of the recordkeeping requirements and decide not
to comply with them may be found guilty of the crime of will-
ful failure to keep records. 124 This is a misdemeanor punish-
120. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (striking down state
sodomy laws as a violation of the right to privacy).
121. See Knauer, supra note 30, at 216 ("The costs involved in requiring a
married couple to file as individuals are routinely cited as a reason against the
adoption of individual filing.").
122. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
123. It is worth noting that the Treasury Regulations define "negligence" for
purposes of the accuracy-related penalty provisions of § 6662, see supra notes
80-81 and accompanying text, to include "any failure by the taxpayer to keep
adequate books and records." Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (as amended in 1998).
124. I.R.C. § 7203 (2004). It is worth noting that if willfulness also character-
izes the failure to withhold and deposit taxes as required by I.R.C. § 3406
(2004), then the partner required to withhold and deposit the taxes may be sub-
ject to a civil penalty equal to 100% of the underpayment, I.R.C. § 6672(a)
(2004), as well as criminal penalties under I.R.C. § 7202 (2004). Violations of
§ 7202 are punishable by a fine of up to $250,000, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3) (2004),
and/or imprisonment of not more than five years, and the defendant may also be
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able by a fine of up to $100,000,125 imprisonment of up to one
year, or both-together with the costs of prosecution.'26 These
criminal penalties are imposed in addition to, and not in lieu
of, the civil penalties discussed above.2 7
The "willfulness" necessary to be convicted of this crime
does not require "evil motive, bad purpose, or corrupt de-
sign. " "' Rather, it requires only "a voluntary, intentional vio-
lation of a known legal duty."'29 Couples who are aware of the
recordkeeping requirement and refuse to comply (either as an
act of civil disobedience or because they find the task impos-
sible to complete) arguably satisfy this definition of "willful-
ness." The blissfully ignorant may, however, escape criminal
liability for their failure:
Congress has... softened the impact of the common-law
presumption [that every person knows the law] by making
specific intent to violate the law an element of certain fed-
eral criminal tax offenses. Thus, the Court almost 60
years ago interpreted the statutory term "willfully" as
used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an
exception to the traditional rule [that ignorance of the law
or mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution].
This special treatment of criminal tax offenses is largely
due to the complexity of the tax laws. 3 °
The Supreme Court has further held that a mistake of
law need not be objectively reasonable in order to negate the
knowledge requirement of "willfulness"; the mistake of law
need only be based on a good-faith belief.'
3. The Code as Sodomy Statute
Given the array of civil and criminal penalties that the
IRS has at its disposal, gay and lesbian couples who pool in-
come and share expenses are nearly assured that they will
made to pay the costs of prosecution. I.R.C. § 7202 (2004).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(5) (fine for a Class "A" misdemeanor); see also id.
§ 3559(a)(6) (2004) (defining a Class "A" misdemeanor).
126. I.R.C. § 7203.
127. Id.
128. Wilson v. United States, 250 F.2d 312, 319 (9th Cir. 1957), reh'g denied,
254 F.2d 391 (1958).
129. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) (per curtam), reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976); see also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200-
01 (1991).
130. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200.
131. Id. at 203-04.
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not escape an IRS assault unscathed. Those who remain
blissfully ignorant of these tax issues may not be subject to
criminal penalties for failing to keep appropriate records;
however, they may be liable for civil penalties because of their
inability to rely on the reasonable cause exception. Those
who are aware of their legal obligations and make a good
faith attempt at compliance may be able to avoid civil penal-
ties by relying on the reasonable cause exception; however,
they may have a tougher time avoiding criminal penalties if
they are aware of the recordkeeping requirements, but volun-
tarily and intentionally fail to comply with them because they
impose a crushing burden. Those who engage in civil disobe-
dience get the worst treatment, as they face the possibility of
both civil and criminal penalties for failing to comply with
their tax obligations.
Seen in this light, the Code takes on the aspect of another
codification of society's hostility towards homosexuality: the
(now outmoded) sodomy statute. Like a sodomy statute, the
Code targets and punishes gay sex, albeit indirectly through
the proxy of gay coupling.'32 And despite being underen-
forced 33 (much like a sodomy statute),' the Code and its civil
and criminal penalties nonetheless "hang as an ominous
Sword of Damocles over the heads of lesbians and gay men
throughout the country.''
132. For discussion of this conflation of homosexual identity and homosexual
conduct, see Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws,
Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643, 689-94 (2001); Janet
E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 passim (1993); and Christopher R. Leslie, Creat-
ing Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 168-78 (2000).
133. The audit rate for individuals in 2002 was only 0.57%, down from 0.92%
in 1993 and a high of 1.67% during the ten-year period from 1993-2002. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-03-378, TAx ADMINISTRATION: IRS SHOULD
CONTINUE TO EXPAND REPORTING ON ITS ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 38 app. III at
tbl. 6 (2003). But underenforcement does not mean no enforcement at all. Cain
has powerfully recounted the experiences of several different gay and lesbian
couples that have undergone IRS estate tax audits. Cain, Death Taxes, supra
note 21, at 696-97.
134. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) ("In those States where
sodomy is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there
is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in pri-
vate.").
135. Evan Wolfson & Robert S. Mower, When the Police Are in Our Bed-
rooms, Shouldn't the Courts Go in Afler Them?: An Update on the Fight
Against "Sodomy"Laws, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997 (1994).
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For those who are targeted, the punishment can be quite
severe: double or triple taxation of a portion of the higher-
earning partner's income, plus one or more civil penalties
(some of which can reach as high as twenty to twenty-five
percent of the amount owed), plus interest on the additional
tax and penalties (compounded daily), plus a criminal fine of
up to $100,000, plus up to one-year in jail. This punishment
is much harsher than the fine of no more than $500 that was
imposed by Texas'36 before its sodomy statute was recently
declared unconstitutional.'37 On the other hand, it is not
nearly so draconian as the five years to life in prison that
Idaho meted out for violating its sodomy statute before the
decision in Lawrence.
38
Moreover, as is the case with a sodomy statute, the im-
pact of the Code on gays and lesbians is not confined to the
civil and criminal penalties that may be imposed on the oc-
currence of the rare audit or prosecution. ' The Code can also
harm gays and lesbians in other ways. As one of the more
prominent applications of the Defense of Marriage Act, the
.Code is overtly hostile to gays and lesbians. This overt hostil-
ity toward gay and lesbian couples stigmatizes them by
branding their relationships inferior to those of straight cou-
ples. In effect, the Code at once embodies and perpetuates so-
cietal prejudice, discrimination, and hostility toward gays and
lesbians by giving such activity the imprimatur of the federal
government.
The bewilderment and discomfort that follow on the heels
of this overt hostility further reinforce the stigma. In defin-
ing marriage for purposes of federal law, DOMA makes no
explicit mention of gay and lesbian couples-even though its
purpose is to brand them inferior.'o Its condemnation of ho-
mosexuality comes instead by implication and through expla-
136. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.23, 21.06 (Vernon 2003).
137. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
138. IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Michie 2003).
139. For a discussion of the myriad ways in which the mere existence of sod-
omy statutes harmed gays and lesbians, see Goodman, supra note 132, passim;
Leslie, supra note 132, passim.
140. The DOMA amendment to the full faith and credit clause does, however,
mention "relationship[s] between persons of the same sex." Defense of Marriage
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2000)).
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nation in committee reports that few will ever read. 4' This
discomfort at officially and prominently acknowledging the
existence of gay and lesbian couples can also be detected in
the noticeable failure of Congress and the IRS to address the
application of the Code to gay and lesbian couples. It can ad-
ditionally be detected in the need to shoe-horn gay and les-
bian couples into desexualized tax categories (e.g., donor-
donee, business partners, or employer-employee) at odds with
the reality of their relationships. Relationships between gay
men and lesbians are apparently so repugnant that they can-
not be acknowledged as such; instead, they must either be ig-
nored or reshaped into more acceptable, and less loathsome,
molds.
This bewilderment and discomfort engender a more in-
sidious form of hostility that attempts to make gay and les-
bian couples a party to their own oppression by driving them
into the closet (or for those already there, further into the
closet). The Code encourages gay and lesbian couples not to
file returns or statements with the IRS that connect one
partner with the other.' If they dare to do otherwise, they
expose themselves to a panoply of civil and criminal penal-
ties, and, for those in the closet, to the public outing that tax
litigation would necessarily entail (should they choose to fight
the IRS's determination in court). The Code thus attempts to
banish our relationships from sight, making us invisible once
again.
IV. CONCLUSION
So, you see, I am not concerned with whether my tax bill
would go up or down were I allowed to check the "married fil-
ing jointly" box on my Form 1040. As a gay man, that is the
least of my worries. Much more important to me is finding
someone with whom I can share my life. About two years
ago, I was lucky enough to meet a wonderful man and fall in
love for a second time. We're planning on moving in together
later this year. Naturally, as a geeky tax lawyer/academic,
all of the problematic tax aspects of our relationship lurk in
the back of my mind, but they will never be a reason not to al-
low our relationship to grow and progress. Where the rela-
141. H.R. REP. No. 104-664 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905.
142. See Cain, Taxing Lesbians, supra note 41, at 478.
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tionship goes will ultimately be about our feelings, and not
about the attendant tax costs.
What is important to me, however, is that we, as a cou-
ple, be treated with dignity and respect. But that is not what
we get-either from society or from the Code. Instead, both
society and the Code treat us with a combination of hostility,
bewilderment, and discomfort that, to paraphrase the epi-
graph at the beginning of this essay, demeans our existence
and attempts to control our destiny by essentially making our
private sexual conduct a tax crime. If that's not discrimina-
tion, what is?
